Cyber Situation Report Switzerland, Week 45/2026
Voluntary reports to the NCSC per week, last 52 weeks
Report categories in the reporting week
Ransomware cases in Switzerland most recently listed on leak sites
Sources: NCSC reporting statistics and ransomware.live, data as of this edition. Only publicly reported or visible activity is recorded. The names of the organisations listed were published by the ransomware groups themselves. Initcon does not add names and does not assess individual cases. “Entries according to ransomware.live” counts the leak-site entries of the 365 days up to the end of the reporting week that ransomware.live attributes to Switzerland; entries whose description places the organisation in another country are not counted. Sectors follow the ransomware.live classification.
The situation in three sentences
Reports to the federal authorities increased compared with the previous week, driven by the usual preponderance of phishing and fraud attempts. During the reporting week, four Swiss ransomware cases became publicly visible, including a fiduciary and real estate company, two industrial firms and a pharmaceutical manufacturer. Viewed over ninety days, ransomware repeatedly affects service providers who manage third-party customer data; thus part of the risk lies outside the organisation’s own infrastructure, in the supply chain.
Key figures for the week
- Reporting period: 2 November 2026 to 8 November 2026
- Voluntary reports to the NCSC: 1,364, an increase of 109 compared with 1,255 in the previous week
- Phishing: 600 reports, still the largest single category
- Fraud attempts: 429 reports
- Spam: 158 reports
- Other categories: 177 reports
- Ransomware cases listed on leak sites in Switzerland over the last 90 days: 35, of which 4 in the reporting week (Treuhand & Immobilien Abt AG, HighTec, Labatec, Erowa)
Assessment for the board of directors and executive management
The overall picture at the federal level remains essentially unchanged. Phishing and fraud attempts together account for by far the largest share of reports, and the increase of 109 reports falls within the usual fluctuation of recent weeks. For oversight, this means: the attack vector through deceived employees and forged payment requests remains the permanent baseline threat against which the organisation must be structured.
The shift becomes visible in the ransomware cases that come to light. During the reporting week, a ransomware group listed a service provider that manages financial and real estate data for third parties. Over the past ninety days, this case fits into a recurring pattern: two fiduciary firms, an architecture and engineering firm, several technology companies and a data centre were affected, whose leak site entry names data from client companies. Those who engage such service providers carry the risk with them, even if the incident occurs outside their own organisation. Industry and pharmaceuticals remain a stable focus at the same time, with Erowa and Labatec this week and Holcim a few days earlier.
For overall supervision under Art. 716a OR, this means a twofold perspective. The board of directors must be able to rely on the executive management having its own systems under control. Equally, the executive management must know which external service providers hold business-critical or particularly sensitive data and what happens if those providers fail. An incident at a fiduciary firm or IT partner can impair the organisation’s own operational capability and trigger its own reporting obligation, without anything having happened in the organisation’s own network.
Three questions for executive management
- Which external service providers manage our business-critical or particularly sensitive data, and for which of these relationships is it contractually regulated how and within what timeframe we will be informed in the event of an incident?
- If our fiduciary, our real estate or IT service provider were extorted via a leak site tomorrow: would we know in good time whether and which of our data are affected, and who would then decide on our own reporting and communication obligation?
- Week after week, phishing forms the largest reporting category, usually followed by fraud attempts: what key figure does executive management present to us that shows whether our employees actually recognise and report such attempts in their daily work?
The data basis consists of the public statistics of voluntary reports to the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and publicly disclosed ransomware cases according to leak site monitoring (ransomware.live). The figures reflect only publicly reported or visible activity.
Corrected on 9 November 2026: Labatec sector, phrasing on leak site entries, reference to executive management
Corrected on 11 November 2026: figures following revision of the NCSC statistics, direction of weekly change