The technology and cyber situation report for boards and executive management

Cyber Situation Report Switzerland, Week 45/2026

9 November 2026 · updated on 11 November 2026 · AI summary · reviewed by Remo Stebler

The situation in three sentences

Reports to the federal authorities increased compared with the previous week, driven by the usual preponderance of phishing and fraud attempts. During the reporting week, four Swiss ransomware cases became publicly visible, including a fiduciary and real estate company, two industrial firms and a pharmaceutical manufacturer. Viewed over ninety days, ransomware repeatedly affects service providers who manage third-party customer data; thus part of the risk lies outside the organisation’s own infrastructure, in the supply chain.

Key figures for the week

Assessment for the board of directors and executive management

The overall picture at the federal level remains essentially unchanged. Phishing and fraud attempts together account for by far the largest share of reports, and the increase of 109 reports falls within the usual fluctuation of recent weeks. For oversight, this means: the attack vector through deceived employees and forged payment requests remains the permanent baseline threat against which the organisation must be structured.

The shift becomes visible in the ransomware cases that come to light. During the reporting week, a ransomware group listed a service provider that manages financial and real estate data for third parties. Over the past ninety days, this case fits into a recurring pattern: two fiduciary firms, an architecture and engineering firm, several technology companies and a data centre were affected, whose leak site entry names data from client companies. Those who engage such service providers carry the risk with them, even if the incident occurs outside their own organisation. Industry and pharmaceuticals remain a stable focus at the same time, with Erowa and Labatec this week and Holcim a few days earlier.

For overall supervision under Art. 716a OR, this means a twofold perspective. The board of directors must be able to rely on the executive management having its own systems under control. Equally, the executive management must know which external service providers hold business-critical or particularly sensitive data and what happens if those providers fail. An incident at a fiduciary firm or IT partner can impair the organisation’s own operational capability and trigger its own reporting obligation, without anything having happened in the organisation’s own network.

Three questions for executive management

  1. Which external service providers manage our business-critical or particularly sensitive data, and for which of these relationships is it contractually regulated how and within what timeframe we will be informed in the event of an incident?
  2. If our fiduciary, our real estate or IT service provider were extorted via a leak site tomorrow: would we know in good time whether and which of our data are affected, and who would then decide on our own reporting and communication obligation?
  3. Week after week, phishing forms the largest reporting category, usually followed by fraud attempts: what key figure does executive management present to us that shows whether our employees actually recognise and report such attempts in their daily work?

The data basis consists of the public statistics of voluntary reports to the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and publicly disclosed ransomware cases according to leak site monitoring (ransomware.live). The figures reflect only publicly reported or visible activity.

Corrected on 9 November 2026: Labatec sector, phrasing on leak site entries, reference to executive management

Corrected on 11 November 2026: figures following revision of the NCSC statistics, direction of weekly change